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THE TAX MAN COMETH:
THE PARADOX OFJUDICIAL
CONSERVATISM OR GREAT
EXPECTATIONS DISAPPOINTED*
ROGER HANDBERG**

I. INTRODUCTION
When presidents appoint individuals to the United States
Supreme Court a prediction is made about their future behavior.
These predictions are not always on the mark primarily because the
issues confronted by the appointee are such that no previous
experience exists or the appointer is diverted by other
considerations. Other considerations can include alleged political
payoffs for past help, friendship ties which override political/legal
considerations, and estimations of future political benefits.1 The
point is that Supreme Court justices are not found under cabbage
leaves. An individual justice is appointed in the hope that he or she
will further certain policy objectives.
Former President Nixon in his 1968 presidential campaign put
it best, though somewhat crudely, when he called for the
appointment of "strict constructionists. "2 Mr. Nixon obviously
meant "conservatives" rather than "strict constructionists" since
judicial restraint and activism are sometime things for both
conservatives and liberals. Whatever his terminology, Mr. Nixon,
by January, 1972, was able through his four appointments to
restructure the Court from its perceived former liberal activism.
With all these apparent victories a constant complaint among
conservative politicians has been the inability to translate power
into policy. Illustrative of this was the following query by Barry
Goldwater in 1960. "Why should the nation's underlying
* Frepared under the auspices of the iNER-sponsored summei institute at the University of
Virginia directed by Professor HenryJ. Abraham.
* * B.A., Florida State University; Ph.D., University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill;
Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Central Florida.
1. H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS; A POLITICAL HISTORY OF. APPOINTMENTS TO THE
SUPREME COURT Ch. 3 (1975); R. SCICLIANO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESIDENCY Ch. 5
(1971).
2.J. SIMON. IN His OWN IMAGE; THE SUPREME COURT IN RICHARD NIXON'S AMERICA (1973).
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allegiance to Conservative principles have failed to produce
corresponding deeds in Washington?" 3 Fifteen years later, Patrick
Buchanan, conservative ideologue of the Nixon Administration,
was moved as follows to voice a similar complaint: "Yet, with all
the conservative primary, convention and election victories of the
past decade, with the polls showing a national drift to the right,
conservative influence upon public policy in America has been
pitifully small. Conservatives have failed utterly to translate
'4
political support and ballot victories into national policy."
Whatever the factual content of these views, what is important is
the disparity that is acknowledged to exist between aspirations and
policy. This paper is an attempt to grapple with that disparity in the
context of the Supreme Court. Explicitly, the concern is with the
behavior of those conservative appointees in the area of tax law.
Specifically, what are the constitutional rights of the taxpayer when
that individual is being investigated by the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS)?
The conservative movement in American politics is based on a
fundamental distrust, even hatred, of the administrative state as it
has developed over the past forty years. In a genteel way, the issue
is whether the conservative appointees reflect that distaste as
expressed by the politicos. The argument advanced here is that the
conservative justices on the Court have failed to uphold what
conservatives see as the rights of the individual confronted by the
minions of the state. The result has been that an interesting
dichotomy has appeared between electoral political conservatism
and what is termed judicial conservatism.
Electoral or popular conservatism, as espoused by leading
political figures, has seen the Court as the defender of the
individual against the actual abuses and the potential arbitrary
discretion of the state. In this view, the Warren Court was an
aberration since its focus was upon those who unduly benefitted
from the state, i.e., welfare recipients. Judicial conservatism and
liberalism as developed and applied by the Supreme Court (and the
federal judiciary generally) has seen the Court as fostering or
furthering the ability of the state to gather tax revenue as efficiently
3. B. GOLDWATER. THE CONSCIENCE OF A CONSERVATIVE 4 (1960)[hereinafter cited as CONSCIENCE OF A CONSERVATIVE]. This concern was echoed again a decade later. B. GOLDWATER,
THE CONSCIENCE OF A MAJORITY 4 (1970) [hereinafter cited as CONSCIENCE OF A MAJORITY].
4.

P.

BUCHANAN,

CONSERVATIVE VOTES,

LIBERAL VICTORIES:

WHY THE RIGHT HAS

FAILED 4

(1975). His solution is the capture of the Presidency by a "principled and dedicated Man of the
Right" who would then fight through the wars against the vested liberal interests. Id. at 164, 166.
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and inclusively as possible.' The result has been that a tension has
developed between the conservative politician and the conservative
judge. This tension is often not directly recognized by either since
the justices see themselves as applying the logic of the law while the
6
politicos ascribe the malaise to the general political/legal system.

II. TWO STRAWPERSONS
Since the New Deal and the constitutional crisis of 1937, the
fundamental issue of the continuation of the administrative or
positive state has become a moot issue. 7 Arguments have largely
shifted to issues of procedural rights and attempts to restrain
obvious abuses of governmental discretion. 8 Conservatives, both
political and judicial, have accepted an enlarged role for the state
although questions are raised about the necessity for further
expansion and the hope is held out for reduction in both its scope
and more likely in the size of government. 9
Definitions of conservative and liberal remain inherently
slippery terms because historical change forces redefinition in order
to cope with new problems. 10 Conservatism, generally, has been
the attempt to cope on an incremental basis with the fact of social
change. Generally though, conservatism, as defined in this paper,
holds a negative and limited view of the state. Conservatives are
suspicious of what is seen as excessive state power and discretion
while emphasizing the rights of the individual relative to the state. I"
Much of conservative political activity and thought is focused upon
economic rights. In fact, concern for economic individualism is
12
probably stronger than concern about abstract individual rights.
5. Handberg, Supreme CourtJustices Vote About 2 to 1 in Favorof the IRS in Tax Cases, 43J. TAX. 376
(1975); Handberg, Jr., The Burger Court and "Old" and "New" Agencies, table 2 (unpublished
paper presented to 1975 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association)
6. G. HARRISON, ROAD TO THE RIGHT: THE TRADITION AND HOPE OF AMERICAN CONSERVATISM
(1954). "Libertarian conservatives have with justice concentrated their attention upon the cancerlike growth of the State, as its malignant cells invade the body of society ever more widely." F.
MEYER, THE CONSERVATIVE MAINSTREAM 148 (1969).
7. C. PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT A STUDY INJUDICIAL POLITICS AND VALUES, 1937-1947
ch. 4 (1948).
8. Saferstein, Nonreview ability: A FunctionalAnalysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion, "82 HARV.
L. REV. 367, 393 (1968). The article presents the various reasons advanced by the courts for allowing
maximum agency discretion.
9. G. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE 14 (1975).
10. C. JOYNER, THE REPUBLICAN DILEMMA: CONSERVATISM OR PROGRESSIVISM (1963); C.
ROSSITER, CONSERVATISM IN AMERICA (1955); Huntington, Conservatism as an Ideology, 51 AM. POL.
SCI. R. 454, 473 (1957).
11. R. KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE MIND, FROM BURKE TO SANTAYANA 2(1953);F. MEYER, supra
note 6, at 55; Mc Closky, Conservatismand Personality, 52 AM. POL. Scl. R. 27 (1958).
12. A typical statement is the following one by William F. Buckley. "It is a part of the
conservative intuition that economic freedom is the most precious temporal freedom, for the reason
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Tax laws and their enforcement present an intriguing amalgam of
both economic and political issues when one attempts to delineate
how much power the state should have, especially under our
particular Constitution with its Bill of Rights. Modern
conservatives do not reject the existence or necessity of the state;
they only restrict its reality. Obvious caveats exist. Conservatism is
hostile to what is seen as excessive coddling of criminals although
this attitude may be a class-related phenomenon. The instances
usually referred to are common criminals often engaged in violent
crimes or crimes destructive of property rather than white collar
criminals. These types of offenses are seen as endemic to certain
unsavory groups in the society who are somewhat beyond the pale
of decent society.
Liberalism, again for this paper, views the state in positive
expansionistic terms. The state is perceived as the engine for social
change and ultimately social betterment. In this benign image,
individual rights are not subordinated to the state, especially
"fundamental rights."1 3 Rather, the state, through its activities, is
able to make it possible for an individual to develop those rights
more fully. The individual and the state are seen as operating in
harmony (a partnership for good rather than a struggle of
opposites) to further their quest to maximize societal/individual
goals, i.e., to promote the common good. 14 An individual may be
forced to curtail certain idiosyncratic behavior but the assumption
is that the tradeoff is worth the minor cost.
Both these positions are strawpersons, especially given the
disillusionments that have occurred in recent years. The liberal
faith in the benignness of governmental institutions has been rudely
shattered. Conservatism has been buttressed in its faith in the
inherent evil of big government; but it is hardpressed to develop an
alternative. The concern in both camps is how to best channel
government activity into positive controllable directions. 15
that it alone gives to each one of us, in our comings and goings in our complex society, sovereignty -

and over that part of existence in which by far the most choices have in fact to be made, and in which
it is possible to make choices, involving oneself, without damage to other people. And for the further
reason that without economic freedom, political and other freedoms are likely to be taken from us."
W. BUCKLEY, Up FROM LIEERALISM 179 (1959).

13. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U. S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938); Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U. S. 319 (1937). See A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW ch. 31 (1956).

14. The best example of this positive imaage of the State was Lyndon Johnson's 1964
presidential campaign against Barry Goldwater. Johnson saw the presidency and the federal
government as the force for good in the society. See L. JOHNSON, THE VANTAGE POINT: PERSPECTIVES
OF THE PR ESIDENCY, 1963-1969(1971).

15. An example of this shift was the change in Mr. Justice William 0. Douglas' position on tax
cases specifically, and on the issue of agency descretion generally. See Wolfman, Silver & Silver, The
Behavior of Justice Douglas in Federal Tax Cases, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 235, 301 (1973). See also Canon &
Miles, supra note 5; Handberg, Jr., The Burger Court and "Old" and "New" Agencies, supra note
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III. THE NIXON APPOINTEES
Richard Nixon's accession to power in 1969 was seen by many
conservatives initially as an attempt to reverse the tide of big
government symbolized so well by the following phrase: Great
Society. An important early gesture in this attempt at reversal was
the appointment of Chief Justice Warren Burger. Chief Justice
Burger's earlier judicial reputation, while on the District of
Columbia's Court of Appeals, had been developed as a protestor
and dissenter from the Warren Court's policy positions. The
appointment was seen politically as the administration's attempt to
repudiate and reverse what had been done earlier.16
Subsequent appointments and near confirmations of Judges
Haynesworth and Carswell were continuations of that effort. In
these two instances, the effort was at appointment of what was
termed a "Southern strict constructionist," i.e., conservative as
part of the Southern electoral strategy. This ignored the fact that a
Southern strict constructionist, Justice Black, was already on the
bench. His fault was his liberalism, not his strict construction of the
Constitution.
The importance of all this is that the Nixon Administration by
its appointment behavior demonstrated its belief that conservative
justices would render conservative decisions. In fact, the belief is a
correct one. Several scholars, using quantitative and qualitative
techniques, have identified the four Nixon appointees as
conservatives. 1 7 The effect has been a gradual reduction in the
Court's involvement in fostering social and legal change and in a
resistance to pleas for further expansion of the rights of the accused.
Restricted by adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis, there has not
been a general rollback of Warren Court precedents. Rather, the
process has been one of limiting or distinguishing prior
precedents. 18 Ironically, the conservative-dominated Court has
opened several important issue areas with which the Warren Court
had either not dealt or had made only tentative policy choices.
5, at app. A. This dtsquietude was further reflected in the 1976 presidentia election process where
the three major candidates, Carter, Ford and Reagan, were united in their distrust of big
government.
16. H. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 4; S. WASBY, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE: FROM THE WARREN
COURT TO THE BURGER COURT ch. 2 (1976).
17. G. SCHUBERT, THEJUDICIAL MIND REVISITED: PSYCHOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT
IDEOLOGY table 5.4 (1974); Handberg,Jr., The 1974 Term of the UnitedStates Supreme Court, 29W. POL.
Q. 298 (1976).
18. The process of revision may be accelerating with the appointment of Mr. Justice Stevens.
On the last day of the 1975 Term, a series of decisions came down severely limiting fourth
amendment claims. See, e. g., Stone v. Powel, 428 U. S. 465 (1976) (limiting the ability of prisoners
to appeal to federal court before exhausting state remedies).
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Examples are the various abortion decisions, sex discrimination
cases, continuance of busing policies, racial and alien
equalitarianism, and price fixing by the legal profession.19
IV. THE PARADOX
When the substantive focus is on the narrow question of the
individual's rights relative to the government in its guise as tax
collector, a paradox appears. 20 The paradox has been the
reluctance generally of the Court, and notably the conservatives, to
extend to the taxpayer the protections afforded, however
reluctantly, the common thief. In this situation, a gap appears
between the political conservative and the judicial conservative.
Rather than a linear relationship occurring between the two, the
judicial conservative seems to have moved over beside the liberal in
support of the tax collector. Meanwhile, the political conservatives
have complained of what are termed the excesses and abuses of the
tax system. These complaints have apparently fallen on deaf legal
ears. 2 1 One common complaint made is that the Court, which often
looks at the actual operation of statutes in other cases, has not been
willing to subject the IRS procedures to the same close scrutiny.
The presumption is that the state does not lie and evidence to the
22
contrary is not seriously entertained.
One should note that the justices are not being asked to return
to the kneejerk anti-statism of the late 19th century or the early and
middle 1930s. 21 Instead, the pressure or expressed hope is that the
justices will establish a clear concern with the protection of the
individual in that person's dealings with the state. What would
result would be a healthy skepticism. about the claims of the State,
especially in an area as sensitive to potential abuse as the taxing
19. E. g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 G. S. 773 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U. S. 677 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U. S. 1(1971).
IRS in Tax Cases, 43J. TAX, 376
20. Handberg, Supreme CourtJustice VoteAbout2to I in Favorof the
(1975).
21. "The penetrative vision of the tax collectors now is slightly less ubiquitous than Orwell's
telescreen." C. MANION, THE CONSERVATIVE AMERICAN 176 (1964).
22. This complaint has been made most strongly in the use of Section 6851 of the Internal
Revenue Code which allows the Government at its discretion to calculate a tax deficiency, sieze the
taxpayer's property to pay the deficiency, and complete this process before review is allowable. The
suspected criminals without formal court proceedings. Note, Jeopardy
effort is to "punish"
Terminations Under Section 6851." The Taxpayer's Rights and Remedies, 60 IOWA L. REV. 644 (1975). An
even longer standing complaint has been the lack of judicial scrutiny into the reality of tax
investigations. Weiss, Do Taxpayers Have Constitutional Rights, 46 TAXES 494, 496 (1968); Note,
Criminal Tax Fraud Investigations: Limitation on the Scope of the Section 7602 Summons, 25 U. FLA. L. REV.
114, 123(1972).
23. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,
157 U. S. 429 (1895). See F. RODELL, NINE MEN ch. 6 (1955).
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power. The state has the authority to tax - that is beyond dispute
unless the sixteenth amendment is repealed. A move for repeal has
been supported by the more extreme conservatives but is not seen
24
as a real practical possibility.
25
V. THE COURT IN ACTION

Over the past few years, the Burger Court, and notably the
Nixon appointees, has significantly strengthened the reach of the
IRS when it investigates alleged tax violators. This strengthening
process has involved the establishment of precedents which either
deny the suspect the right to challenge certain methods of evidence
collection or restrict the applicability of the constitutional rights
granted the accused. 26 In all cases, the Court's presumption, well
founded in administrative law, has been to favor the discretion and
good faith of the agency, a presumption not shared by the outside
conservative audience where the IRS is perceived in much more
27
ambivalent or malevolent terms.
Privilege against self-incrimination has been an oft-assured
defense in tax fraud litigation. The basic argument has been that
the legal requirement to produce certain books, papers, and other
data relevant to a determination of a person's tax liability
constitutes self-incrimination. 28 The process begins when the IRS
issues an administrative summons to the taxpayer or other
individuals and organizations which possess relevant records. The
24. Repeal of the sixteenth amendment has been a goal for more extreme conservative groups,
C. MAMION, supra note 21, at 178-79; Lipset, The Sources of the 'Radical Right, ' in THE NEw AMERICAN
RItT 189 (D. Bell ed. 1955).
25. This section provides a synopsis of the Court's activities - its purpose is informational
relative to the political issue being discussed. The reader is referred to the numerous indexed articles
available on the technical issues of precedent, statutory construction and tax advice to clients.
26. Most of the evidence is collected by the IRS through the summons power granted in Section
7602 of the Internal Revenue Code.
27. "The 'nature. of things,' I submit, is quite different. Government does not have an unlimited
claim on the earnings of individuals." CONSCIENCE OF ACONSERVATIVE at 59.
28. One difficulty that has clouded the issue has been the fact that government has to require
certain records be kept in order to efficiently and successfully administer programs. ".In Boyd v.
United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886), the Supreme Court held that the Government could not compel
an individual to surrender his private papers. Later,. however, the Supreme Court, in Shapiro v.
United States, 335 U. S. 1 (1948), held that records required by the Emergency Price Control
legislation were not private papers- within the meaning of Boyd, but were 'required records'
unprotected by the fifth amendment. The leading case of Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U. S. 846 (1953), involved a proceeding against a certified public accountant
who refused to comply with a special agent's summons to produce his client's tax records. Noting
that the Code authorizes the IRS to inspect a taxpayer's records, the court held that the tax records
were not protected by the fifth amendment, whether in the hands of an accountant or a taxpayer."
Comment, ConstitutionalRights of the Taxpayer in a Tax FraudInvestigation, 42 TUL. L REv. 862, 862-63
(1968). The issue has not been directly posed to the Court of what would be required to justify
government access to purely personal tax records with no instance of outside assistance to the taxpayer
such as an accountant or lawyer.
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taxpayer can challenge enforcement of a summons aimed at the
individual taxpayer personally but not that directed at third parties.
In Donaldson v United States, 29 the Court was called upon to
quash certain summonses directed at the individual's former
employer. The fourth amendment challenge of unreasonable
search and seizure was dismissed on the basis of FirstNationalBank v
United States.30 The case was straight forward in its application of
precedent and drew a seven justice majority opinion by Mr. Justice
Blackmun plus two concurring opinions. Donaldson represents a
clear instance of reaffirming the personal nature of the rights
established under the first eight amendments. One cannot, except
in limited instances, establish standing to assert a privilege broader
than one's person and its immediate environs.
Two years later, in Couch v United States, 3 1 the Court, in an
opinion by Mr. Justice Powell, rejected a taxpayer's claim that
certain records given to her accountant for the purposes of tax
preparation were protected by the fifth amendment. The records
had been given to the accountant, an independent contractor, since
1955. Though surrendering possession, the petitioner had legally
retained title to the records. When the accountant received an IRS
summons, Couch had the records turned over to her attorney. The
issue was defined as "whether her proprietary interest further
enables her to assert successfully a privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination to bar enforcement of the summons and
production of the records, despite the fact that the records no longer
remained in her possession. "32 Mr. Justice Powell went on to
describe the "intimate and personal" nature of the privilege which
"proscribes state intrusion to extract self-condemnation. ' ' 33 The
"[F]ifth [A]mendment privilege is a personal privilege: it adheres
basically to the person, not to information that may incriminate
him. 34 Therefore, by giving the records over to the accountant for
such a long time period, the Court held that the element of personal
compulsion against the taxpayer was lacking. The summons and
related legal actions were directed at the accountant and not the
taxpayer. By surrendering possession but not legal title for such a
long period of time, Couch compromised the personal and
29. 400 U. S. 517 (1971).
30. 267 U. S. 576 (1925) (per curiam). The summons in First
Nat' Bank had been directed to a
third party bank and the fourth amendment challenge was seen as nongermane.
31. 409 U. S. 322 (1973).
32. Couch v. United States, 409 U. S. 322. 327 (1973).
32
33. Id. at
7.
34. Id. at 328.

THE TAX MAN COMETH

confidential natue of the records. The taxpayer had lost her
expectation of privacy. 3 5 In addition, the Court could find no
confidential accountant-client privilege existing under federal law
and no state-created privilege that had been recognized in federal
cases.3 6 An individual could still use an accountant, but record
disposition would have to be clearly stipulated and controlled if a
taxpayer wished to later make a fifth amendment claim.
The two dissenters, Mr. Justices Douglas and Marshall,
diverged in their respective dissents. Douglas relied on the concept
37
of privacy as protecting such records from government intrusion.
Marshall's dissent was an attempt to identify more clearly when the
records would be protected and when the constitutional protections
would be lifted. 3 8 He argued that the Court had created a "brightline rule that no constitutional right of petitioner is violated by
enforcing a summons of papers not in her possession." ,39 In arguing
against this simplistic rule, Marshall was willing to consider
"disclosure to an accountant is rather close to disclosure to an
attorney. "40 The latter argument like a section ofJustice Douglas's
dissent 41 is based on an empirical argument: the overwhelming
complexity and obscurity of the tax laws makes professional
assistance almost mandatory for taxpayers with unusual or
complicated income patterns. The Court in Couch is seen as making
that service potentially hazardous to the client in some unforeseen
future.
A related series of cases revolves around the issue of bank
records, the extent of record-keeping requirements, and the ability
of the IRS to access those records. 42 In a test case, CaliforniaBankers
Association v Shultz, 43 Mr. Justice Rehnquist for the Court upheld

the basic constitutionality of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970. Certain
of the claims were rejected as premature and failing to assert
sufficient cause. Other issues were disposed of by citing Couch to the
effect that the individual could not assert privilege on testimony or
35. Id. at 336.
36. Id. at 335.
37. Id. at 338-44 (Douglas,J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 344-351 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
39. Id. at 344.
40. Id. at 351.
41. Id. at 342 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
42. The Government's concern was to control organized and white collar crime by establishing clear records of all sizeable financial transactions. This would allow the tracing of financial
transactions from point to point in a stream of transactions. An example would be the tracing of the
funds delivered to the original Watergate breakin team. Flippen, The InternalRevenue Service Summons.
An Unreasonable Expense Burden on Banks and an Invasion of Depositors' Privacy], 12 AM. Bus. L. J. 249
(1975); LeValley & Lancy, The IRS Summons and the Duty of Confidentiality: A Hobson's Choice for
Bankers, 89 BANKING L. J. 979, 995-96 (1972); Mortimer, The IRS Summons and the Duty of
Confidentiality. A Hobson's ChoiceforBankers - Revisited, 92 BANKING L.J. 832 (1975).
43. 416 U. S. 21 (1974).
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evidence by a third party. The Court was clearly concerned with
maintaining the ability of the Government to cope with organized
crime. The three dissenters, Mr. Justices Douglas, Brennan, and
Marshall, saw the Act as allowing the Government almost
unlimited access to an individual's personal records with only
44
superficial controls at best.
The following term, in United States v Bisceglia,45 the Court was
confronted with a "John Doe" summons to a bank. Certain
moneys in deteriorated condition had been deposited to the bank
and were sent to the Federal Reserve for disposal. The IRS
suspected that the moneys related to transactions probably not
reported for tax purposes. After a preliminary investigation, the
"John Doe" summons was issud for all relevant bank records. The
Court, in an opinion by the Chief Justice, upheld the summons
against the objection that it was vague and unduly broad. Mr.
Chief Justice Burger argued that the protection against abuse lie in
the fact that such summons can only be enforced by the courts. 46 In
addition, such fictitious name summons are not unusual and are in
fact common in indictments. The interest of the IRS in
investigating such large cash transactions overrides most objections
of this nature. 47 Mr. Justice Powell, concurring, denied that the
Court had authorized an unlimited power of summons - the
search must be narrow and specific. 48 Mr. Justice Stewart,
dissenting with Justice Douglas, held that there was no protection
since the federal courts had no measurable standard to apply in
judging a summons. 49 The power was construed too broadly and
allowed "a shot in the dark to see if one (an investigation) might be
warranted.' ,50
In a later case, United States v Miller,51 the Court explicitly
upheld the power of the Government to subpoena or issue
summons to banks for a depositor's bank records. The individual
was held unable to assert a fourth amendment claim - as "no
legitimate 'expectation of privacy' "52 existed.
Since no [f]ourth [a]mendment interests of the depositor
are implicated here, this case is governed by the general
44. California Bankers Ass'n v. Schulz, 416 U. S. 21, 79 (1974) kbouglas, Brennan. Marsnall,

J., dissenting).
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

420U. S. 141 (1975).
United States v. Bisceglia. 420U. S. 141, 146(1975).
Id at 149.
Id. at 152 (Blacknun Powell. J.. concurring).
Id. at 153 (Stewart. Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id.at 156.
425 U. S. 435 (1976).
United States v. Miller. 425 U. S.435. 442 (1976).
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rule that the issuance of a subpoena to a third party to
obtain the records of that party does not violate the rights
of a defendant, even if a criminal prosecution is
53
contemplated at the time the subpoena is issued.
The dissenters, Mr. Justices Brennan and Marshall, saw the
depositor as having "a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
bank statements and records." 54 A right was seen as vitiated by the
bank's voluntary relinquishment of the records - an action not
reported to or approved by the depositor.
55
On the same day as Miller, the Court in Fisher v United States,
further restricted the ability of the taxpayer to claim fifth
amendment privilege as regards his personal tax records. The
records had been worked on by his accountant but held by the
taxpayer. In this instance, the taxpayers had turned the documents
over to their attorney. The attorney was then ordered to turn the
records over to the IRS. The Court agreed that the attorney was
obligated to surrender the materials. Arguing that the privilege is
personal ala' Couch, Mr. Justice White stated "that by reason of the
transfer of the documents to the attorneys, those papers may be
subpoenaed without compulsion on the taxpayer. '"56
The
"compelled production of documents from an attorney does not
implicate whatever Fifth Amendment privilege the taxpayer might
57
have enjoyed from being compelled to produce them himself."
Even this caveat was further qualified in that the Court defined the
papers demanded as not the taxpayer's "private papers.' '58
Briefly summarizing this particular line of precedents, the
Court since 1971 has basically forbidden fifth amendment privilege
claims. If an accountant, or by implication an attorney-accountant,
works on the documents - almost a necessity for those in
professional or proprietorial status - the documents are no longer
private and protected. In fact, the Court in dicta seems to even
reject the claim that might be posed by an individual who received
no outside tax counseling. The record keeping requirements of the
Internal Revenue Code apparently destroy any claim to privacy or
constitutional privilege that might exist.5 9 The Court has
53. Id. at 444.
54. Id. at 448 (Brennan, Marshall,J., dissenting).
55. 425 U. S. 391 (1976).
56. Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S. 391, 399 (1976).
57. Id.at 402.
58. Id. at 414.
59. Note, Constitutional Rights and Administrative Investigations, 58 GEo. L. J. 345, 351 (1969);
Note, Constitutional Limits on the Admissibility in the Federal Courts of Evidence Obtained From Required
Records, 68 HARV. L. REV. 340, 341 (1954).
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maximized the power of the state to the point that the fifth
amendment seems only to protect the individual from the rack and
the screw. Commitment of one's personal affairs to paper or some
60
other recording medium leaves it open to government scrutiny.
A related though separate issue has been whether the IRS is
required to give the formal warning mandated by Miranda.
Actually, the IRS had revised its rules in 1967, in a press release, at
least to inform the taxpayer that an investigation was under way.
But this was not to be construed as voluntary imposition of the
Miranda warning on the Service's investigations. 6 1 Precedent in the
lower federal judiciary had emphasized the noncustodial aspects of
the IRS interrogations. In Beckwith v United States, 62 the Court,
the
Chief Justice
Burger,
upheld
through
Mr.
custodial/noncustodial distinction. 6 The warning given by the IRS
was deemed sufficient since the coercive elements of the
interrogation were not deemed overwhelming enough to trigger the
necessity of a Miranda warning. If an individual were placed in
custody then the normal criminal justice process would be invoked.
VI. POLITICAL-JUDICIAL TENSION
Overwhelmingly the Court, despite or because of its
conservative justices has futher expanded the power of the tax
collector. What is striking is the uniform support given these
60. Mr. justice Brennan, concurring in the Fisherjudgment, saw the Court driving toward the
position that no papers however private are protected.
An individual's books and papers are generally little more than an extension of his
person. They reveal no less than he could reveal upon being questioned directly.
Many of the matters within an individual's knowledge may as easily be retained
within his head as set down on a scrap of paper. I perceive no principle which does not
permit compelling. . . . its production. Under a contrary view, the constitutional
protection would turn on fortuity, and persons would, at their peril, record their
thoughts and the events of their lives. The ability to think private thoughts, facilitated
as it is by pen and paper, and the ability to preserve intimate memories would be
curtailed through fear that those thoughts or the events of those memories would
become the subjects of criminal sanctions however invalidly imposed. Indeed, it was
the very reality of those fears that helped provide the historical impetus for the
privilege.
425 U. S. at 420 (Brennan. J.. concurring).
6i The literature on the applicability of the Mlirandarule in tax cases is voluminous. Andres, The
Right to Counsel in Criminal Tax Investigations Under Escobedo and Miranda: The "Critical Stage, ''53 IOWA
L. REV. 1074 (1968); Duke, Prosecutionfor Attempts to Evade Income Tax: A Discordant View of a Procedural
Hybrid, 76 YALE L. J. 1 (1966); Segal, The Miranda Warnings. To What Extent Must the IRS Comply in
Tax Fraud Investigations?, 39J. TAX. 76 (1973): Weiss, supra note 22. at 498: Note. Extending Miranda to
Administrative Investigation, 56 VA. L. REV. 690 (1970).
62. 425 U. S. 341 (1976).
63. In Mathis v. United States. 391 U. S. 1 (1968), the Court explicitly rejected the
Government's position that the tax investigation is immune from Miranda. The limiting factual
circumstance was that the putative taxpayer was in prison at the time of the interrogation. So. if you
are a convicted felon, your rights are more extensive than if you are not incarcerated at the time of
the investigation.
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expansions by the Nixon appointees. 64 Politically, the GoldwaterReagan policital movements were repudiations of that type
deference to expanding government power. President Nixon,
though not as conservative as Senator Goldwater or Governor
Reagan, earlier stated a similar strong personal distaste for big
expansive government. Part of this distaste for big government
apparently vanished in the fire of office on the way to Watergate
but at least rhetorically the distinction was clear. The inquiry then
becomes one of why the conservatives actively fostered this
expansion of governmental taxing power.
Three somewhat distinct explanations commend themselves.
The obvious prime explanation is stare decisis.6 5 Having been
appointed as "strict constructionists," the justices may be seen as
sensitive to the power of precedent. This is not a blind worshipping
of the past, but it necessarily limits Court flexibility on many
issues. A truly precedent-conscious justice would also give due
weight to lower court precedents. In the line of cases delineated
above, notably those dealing with documents and privilege claims,
the policy choice was clearly a fairly direct development of prior
precedent, at least for the dominant bloc. This means that the
Court tends to move in a linear fashion until significant conceptual
problems develop or an extensive personnel turnover occurs.
Interestingly, this development leads the justices to further expand
the prerogatives of the IRS. In effect, the conservative justices are
prisoners of their own rules of the road. Technique overcomes
substance.
This strong precedent orientation is directly related to the
second explanation. The Court is always confronted with
reconciling the law with changing social/political reality. There is
always a gap which is accentuated in more conservative courts
because of their status quo orientations. The world, as it is, is
accepted by the justices because it is the world they know.
Suspicious of rapid social change and political or social
experimentation, their inclination is to hunker down and defend
the present. "Reactionaries,"
"radicals,"
and "liberals" all
propose change - very divergent types of change obviously, but
change. Litigants in tax cases are proponents of change; therefore,
64. The Nixon appointees did not dissent in ans' of he cases although N'
Jiusticc PowlI. most
notably, did concur limiting ws
hat he saw as the broad potential of a particular ruling. E. t,.,
California Bankers Ass'n v.Schultz. 416 U.S. 21, 78(1974).
65. Precedent is not the dead hand of the past on the present but an attempt to provide
continuity to the judicial process. It allows stability and change in an uneasy and shifting mixture of
past wisdom and the needs of the present. Everyone knows its' hcn the, see it.B. CAR0OZO. 1THE
NATURE OF THEJUDtCtAL PROCESS 113-15 (1921):

W. Dot-tLAS, STARE Dcisis (194)).
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the presumption is against them. This presumption against change
is obviously part of the working rules of the Court as enunciated
66
most eloquently by Justice Brandeis in his Ashwander concurrence.
The change that comes is that mandated by the political branches.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger has publically stated that position as the
Court has tightened the rules on standing to sue in environmental
and consumer cases. 67 Since 1937, the government and its actions
are the status quo; ergo, their actions are constitutional.
A final explanation must be tendered which is in fact
generalizable to all conservatives both political and judicial. Their
concern with the individual is a limited one. The focus is upon the
68
good people - the "silent majority" of political rhetoric.
Criminals or those suspected of crime are individuals who by their
actions are beyond the contours of civilization. In order to repress
their deprivations, all weapons must be brought into the struggle.
In this context, the conservatives move to support the maximum
utilization of state power, the assumption being that these weapons
will never be used against them. 69 Individuals who enter the
criminal process are given a minimum of constitutional rights the emphasis is on de minimus. Due process is designed to prevent
automatic punishment and obvious abuses, but the presumption is
against the accused individual. In their view, discretion must flow
in the direction of maximizing the power and options of prosecutor
and the policeperson. The hands of the peace forces' must not be
unduly fettered while the guilty or suspected go free. The tax cases
considered above all the potentiality of criminal prosecution though
such an outcome was not automatic. One might hypothesize that
this element tipped the scales in the direction of maximizing the
power and options of the peace forces.
Whatever the cause, conservative appointments have not led
to a sophisticated discrimination between the state as policeman
and the state as tax collector. In the mishmash of the positive state,
even the conservative justices have absorbed the lesson of 1937 as
"anything goes." 70 Ideology is not dead - its forms are just not
clear in the rarefied atmosphere of the Court. Conservatives
dominate the bar and bench, but the political world is a liberal one.
That liberal domination makes a truly conservative court
66. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288,346-48 (1936) (Brandeis,J., concurring).
67. E. g., Zahn v. International Paper Co.. 414 U. S. 291 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U. S. 727 (1972).
68. CONSCIENCE OF A MAJORITY ch. 2.

69. The classic cases of this assumption in operation were those accused in the Watergate
conspiracy. Their concern for expanded criminal rights has markedly broadened under their
presently adverse conditions.
70. C. PRITCHETT, supra note 7, at ch. 10.
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impossible - only marginal conservatism is feasible. Otherwise,
the Court would be destroyed or crippled beyond repair.7
Conservative politicians will go on proposing that their choices are
the "right" appointments to the Court, but with no guarantee of
doctrinal or political success.

71. The Taney Court, after the 1857 Dred Scott decision, represented the most dramatic example
of the Court being almost destroyed, See R. MCCLOSKEY, THE AmERICAN SUPREME COURT (1960).

